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Resumen 
En las últimas décadas, el populismo ha vuelto a cobrar importancia en América 
Latina. Se expresa en las formas de gobierno de izquierda o derecha, como ocurre en 
Venezuela con Hugo Chávez y Álvaro Uribe en Colombia, así como en expresiones 
de movilizaciones en sectores rebeldes de la población. 
Este concepto ambiguo adquiere diferentes significados. Desde el punto de vista económi-
co, el populismo macroeconómico hace hincapié en el crecimiento a través de políticas 
redistributivas en el corto plazo para aumentar el consumo, dejando de lado el equilibrio 
macroeconómico,  especialmente en lo que respecta a la inflación y el déficit fiscal.
Este documento sostiene que el populismo macroeconómico no es nuevo 
y se ha aplicado en América Latina en varias ocasiones. Con algunas dife-
rencias y en diferentes momentos de la historia económica, los gobiernos 
de Argentina, Chile, Perú y Venezuela, han recurrido al uso de las políticas 
de expansión fiscal, monetaria y de crédito y la sobrevaloración de la mo-
neda para acelerar el crecimiento y redistribuir el ingreso. Cuando se apli-
ca existe la preocupación acerca de las restricciones fiscales y cambiarias. 
El resultado es una inflación galopante y una crisis económica, lo que puede ex-
plicar la inestabilidad y la hiperinflación que América Latina ha experimentado. 
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Colombia, curiosamente, a lo largo de su historia, es una excepción a esta regla, 
debido a la independencia de las instituciones que gestionan la política monetaria 
y las barreras que implica para el ejecutivo.
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Abstract
In recent decades, populism has regained prominence in Latin America. It is expres-
sed in forms of government from left or right as it happens in Venezuela with Hugo 
Chavez and Alvaro Uribe in Colombia, as well as from mobilizations expressions 
rebellious sectors of the population.
This ambiguous concept takes on different meanings. From the economic point of 
view, macroeconomic populism emphasizes growth through redistributive policies 
in the short term to increase consumption, neglecting macroeconomic balance, 
especially with regard to inflation and fiscal deficit.
This paper argues that macroeconomic populism is not new and has been applied in 
Latin America repeatedly. With some differences and at different times of economic 
history, the governments of Argentina, Chile, Peru and Venezuela, have resorted 
to the use of fiscal, monetary and credit expansive policies and overvaluation of 
the currency to accelerate growth and redistribute income. When applied there are 
concerns about fiscal and exchange restrictions.
The result is a galloping inflation and an economic crisis, which may explain the 
instability and hyperinflation that Latin America has experienced. Colombia, cu-
riously, throughout its history, is an exception to this rule, due to the independence 
of the institutions that manage monetary policy and the barriers that implies for 
the executive.
Keywords 
Populism, macroeconomic populist fiscal policy, monetary policy, economic policy, 
hyperinflation, classic hyperinflation, inflation, macroeconomic populism phases, 
stability, Latin America, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia.
introduction 
During the last decade populism has once again come to the center of the political 
scene in Latin America. It is expressed in two different ways.  The first, is the tra-
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ditional style expressed by the government, as in Venezuela with president Hugo 
Chávez.  The second way has origin in mobilization of the population where might 
be a “latent populism” which could become evident when this population reach 
power. Two examples of this type of populism are the cases of “Piqueteros” in 
Argentina and “Cocaleros” in Bolivia (Pinto, 2004).
When we talk about populism we are faced with a very “ambigous concept” 
which can be wide and inclusive (Panizza, 2009). It depends on what we want to 
emphasise.  Then, from the point of view of the economy of a country- which is 
the subject of this article- populism males emphasis on the growth by short term 
public policies of redistribution in order to growth the consumption. These effect 
the macroeconomics equilibrium, especially inflation and fiscal deficit. In this case 
we talk about macroeconomic populism (Dornbusch, 1997). 
There are some cases where the classic populism regimen can apply economic 
decisions which benefit some people. There is a kind of “distributive microeco-
nomic” which can be compatible with a “stable macroeconomic”. It could be 
the case of Menem in Argentina or Fujimori in Peru (Degregori, 2001). But 
macroeconomic populism is not a new situation; it has been applied in Latin 
America in different periods (Edwards, 2009, 33 y ss). Macroeconomic populism 
uses fiscal, monetary and credit expansive policies and strong valuation of the 
currency in order to accelerate the growth of the economic and redistribute 
the income. These policies applied without fiscal and monetary restrictions 
and the result is high inflation and economic crises as has occurred in the next 
cases we are going to analyze in this article (Argentina, Chile and Peru). These 
cases prove that the populism is the cause of the hyperinflation rule and it can 
be seen as a cause of the hyperinflation and the macroeconomic instability in 
Latin America (Edwards, 2009). Colombia, curiously some years ago was the 
exception to this rule.       
1. the research problem
The term populism was originally used in the United States in the mid-1890s, 
referring to the People’s Party, but since almost no movement or leader has ack-
nowledged being “populist.”  In current political parlance, the term has a negative 
connotation, being closely associated with terms like “demagogia”, economic 
bounty, which indicate economic or political irresponsibility (Panizza, 2009, 9).
Populism is a controversial concept, and agreements about what it means and 
who qualifies as a populist is more difficult because this analytical category is not 
want with politicians which to identify themselves (Panizza, 2009, 9).  With the 
economic crisis of the late twentieth century, characterized by external shocks, 
among which are included the effects of the Asian crisis and the Swiss bankruptcy 
(Paramio, 65), the dynamism that characterized the economies of Latin America 
in the early years of the nineties (except for Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay in 
1995) led to a stalemate. This period was called the “five years lost” by ECLAC 
(Ocampo, 2000).
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Therefore, it rediscovered the importance of institutions as a essential framework 
for the proper functioning of markets (Paramio, 66). Above, it said to be the reason 
for the failure of the Washington consensus led to discussion on the idea of a shift 
to the left in Latin America.
However, there was a divergence between political discourse, the position on glo-
balization and the interpretation of democratic reforms and the role of institutions 
(Paramio, 66).  The only coincidence is the emphasis on social policy and the pursuit 
of a focused economic model, not only in growth, but social outcomes, which has 
slowly degenerated into populism.
2.  Metodologhy 
For this article, there will be a comparative exercise of economic policy manage-
ment, fiscal and monetary policy by the various governments in Latin America in 
order to identify the use of economic tools for populist purposes. The selection of 
countries is done arbitrarily and corresponds to the accessibility of information 
on economic variables on the behavior of fiscal and monetary policy. Similarly, 
we use simple graphic variables such as inflation, unemployment, gross domes-
tic product, credit, etc, when available and at different times depending on the 
country for analysis (See Graph 1,2,3,4,5,6). 
The idea is to study at the end the Colombian case and draw lessons that allow 
us to explain, first, the dangers of macroeconomic populism; second, the relative 
economic stability experienced by Colombia in recent decades, in relation to 
neighboring countries.
3. theoretical approximation to macroeconomic populism
3.1 Traditional european hyperinflation and populism 
hyperinflations in Latin America
3.1.1 Traditional European Hyperinflation
The European economies had a hyperinflation process during the twenties in di-
fferent countries (Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Russia). The causes and 
consequences of this phenomenon receive the name of “traditional hyperinflation”. 
(Dornbusch, 1997). The same phenomenon occurred in Latin America during the 
eighties in countries such as Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil and Peru; but exempting 
Bolivia in these countries the causes had a different nature to traditional hyperin-
flation (Dornbusch, 1997).
After the experience of the European countries, economists discussed different 
theories about the characteristics and effects of traditional hyperinflation and the 
effective policies which where applied but resulted in being very expensive for 
the society. Some years later some Latin – America countries were in the same 
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situation as Europe had been, but the same policies did not function because they 
were applied in a very different context (Krugman, 1997). 
The origin of traditional European hyperinflation obeyed external factors. After the 
First World War, the European economies presented high budgets deficits which 
where financed by means of the creation of currency. In order to stop the hype-
rinflation, there was realized an orthodox program or global plan of stabilisation, 
which generated credibility with the public and certainty that the Central Bank 
would not finance the budget deficit by issuing currency. 
The European countries that faced hyperinflation, the incomes only covered a small 
fraction of the total expenses of the country and the collapse in the public incomes 
coincided with the increase of inflation (Olivera Tanzi Effect). (Krugman, 1997). 
In addition, the hyperinflation phenomenon was preceded by an excessive level 
inflation tax (Señoraje).  Undoubtedly, the key components of the integral programs 
of orthodox policies were:
– The policies of stabilisation that were adopted.
– The exchange rate which restored the convertibility of the domestic currency 
in terms of the dollar or of the gold and the reduction of the budget deficit. 
– The credibility of the Central Bank in the public eye when it promised to reject 
the demands of the internal unsecured credits and not to grant any mores internal 
credit to the government (Krugman. 1997). 
3.1.2 Classical populism as a cause of hyperinflation and 
macroeconomic instability in Latin America. 
Hyperinflation in Latin America, with the exception of the Bolivian hyperinflation, 
-which presented traditional characteristics-, occurred in a very particular context. 
The characteristics of the economies of countries like Peru, Brazil and Argentina 
were economies following a tradition of high inflation as a result of macroeconomic 
populism. (Edwards, 2010). The application of populism policies creates high budget 
deficits due to increase in public spending (by the expansion of government and 
state enterprises), as discussed below. It has been demonstrated that Latin America 
generally uses these policies: expansionary fiscal and expansionary credit policies 
and overvaluation of the currency, in order to accelerate growth and redistribute 
income (macroeconomic populism). When the government applies them, there 
is concern about fiscal and exchange restrictions. After a while, decreasing real 
wages and an imbalance in the balance of payments, leading to hyperinflation 
(Dornbush, 1997). 
Moreover, in each country the new anti-inflationary programs coincided with 
the end of a government and the beginning of another.  For this reason it is a 
new opportunity for macroeconomic populism to promise at the same time to 
reduce unemployment and to control inflation. As we know –”Phillips’s Curve” 
teaches that it is not possible to achieve both aims in the short term (Mankiw, 
2003, 474).     
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This is an example of application of the Theory of the “Economic - political 
Cycle” which shows how the government does everything necessary to grow 
and to increase employment and the production of the country in the short 
term by means of increasing public spending, the external debt and the fiscal 
deficit (Mankiw, 2003, 493). These policies cause hyperinflations which could 
be handle by orthodox or heterodox policies which it will apply, on having 
finished its electoral period, or will remained a problem to resolve for the fo-
llowing government. This is an example of the macroeconomic populism as an 
importantly cause the big hyperinflations and of the macroeconomic instability 
in Latin America. 
3.1.3 Phases of macroeconomic populism
Rudiger Dornbush says a populism policy progresses through these phases: 
Chart 1. Phases of populism.
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
Gross 
domestic 
product 
increased
Real wage 
growth
Employment 
growth
Inflation rate 
controlled
Import 
relieves the 
scarcity
Bottlenecks by:
- Strong demand 
growth
- Little foreign 
exchange (To pay 
for imports)
-Inflation Increases
-Wages unchanged 
-Increased 
subsidies
- Increased deficit
Causes:
- Capital flight
-Demonetization 
economic 
(barter)
- Fiscal deficit 
increase
 
-Subsidies 
decrease
 
-Inflation 
increase
 
-Real wages fall 
drastically
Government starts 
stabilization
 IMF Aid and BM 
declining real 
wages 
Control of inflation 
rate
Break companies
The capital flight 
following the 
violent overthrow 
of the government
 
Source: Doornbush, Rudiger. La macroeconomía del populismo. Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997.
Then we are going to study each of the proposed cases. 
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4. Results
4.1 Cases of macroeconomic populism in Latin America
Chart  2. Cases of macroeconomic populism in Latin America 
Country Model Argentina Chile Perú Venezuela
Liberal Primary 
Exporter
19th – 1929
Constitutional 
governments
19th – 1929
Constitutional 
governments
19th – 1962
Militar 
governments
19th – 1958
 Autoritation 
Governments
Industrialization 
for Substitution of 
Import ISI
1930-1990
José Félix 
Uriburu (1932)
1930-1970
Arturo           
Alessandri 
(1932)
1963-1985
Fernando 
Belaúnde           
Gral.  Juan 
Velasco
Gral. Francisco 
Morales
1958-974
Rómulo 
Betancour
Raúl Leoni
Luis Herrera 
Campins
Macroeconomic 
Populism
Peron 
(1946-1955)
Peron II 
(1973-1976)
Military           
gobernment 
(until 1983)
Raúl Alfonsín 
(Austral Plan)
Eduardo Frei 
Montalva 
(194-1970)
Salvador 
Allende 
(1970-1973)
Fernanado 
Belaúnde II
Alan García 
(1985-1990)
Jaime 
Lusinchi 
(1984-1989)
Hugo Chávez 
Frías (1999-
present)
Orthodoxy and 
Market economy
1991-2010
Carlos Menem
Fernando 
de la Rúa
Eduardo 
Duhalde
Nestor 
Kirchner
Cristina 
Kirchner
1973-2004
Pinochet 
Patricio 
Aylwin
Eduardo Frei 
Montalva
Ricardo Lagos
Michelle 
Bachelet
1990-2004
Fujimori 
Valentín 
(interim)
Alejandro 
Toledo
Alan García
1974-1979
Carlos 
Andrés Pérez
1994-1999
Rafael 
Caldera
Source: Marchesi, Giancarlo. The Evolution of Economic and Social Policy in Latin America: A 
Comparative View. The University of Texas at Austin, Institute of Latin American Studies, 
Center for Latin American Social Policy (CLASPO). Researcher Visiting. Perú, February, 
2004, p. 12.  
*This chart has been completed by the author of this article. 
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4. 1.1  Argentina
In the early twentieth century, Argentina was considered one of the world’s most 
developed countries.  In 1890 its income per capita was the sixth highest in the 
world and continued among the top ten until 1920. From 1870-1930 it experien-
ced an average growth rate above 5%, higher than almost all nations of the world. 
During this period the country received several waves of European immigration, 
mainly from Italy, attracted by the good living conditions (Mora and Araujo, 1995). 
This period was characterised by free trade, openness of the economy to foreign, 
monetary and fiscal management well ordered and orderly succession of constitu-
tional government until the Coup d’etat of September 6, 1930 by José Félix Uriburu. 
The effects of the First World War and the Great Depression of 1929 led to a shift in 
development strategy. It began the era of import substitution industrialisation (ISI), 
which was applied during the twentieth century.  In 1943, deposed President Ramon 
Castillo, began a turbulent period in the political history of Argentina. Since then, 
the country has had over 28 presidents. The election of Coronel Juan Domingo Peron 
in 1946, consolidated the model of state intervention in the economy, ushering in 
a period of macroeconomic populism. Peron tried to solve the problems of income 
inequality, through price controls and expansionary policies in state spending. 
These were financed through the inorganic issuance, which generated a problem 
of inflation, that would remain in Argentina for over thirty years 
Also Peron nationalized many businesses, passed legislation that favored labor 
unions and used public funds for the work benefactors of the Foundation Eva Peron, 
led by his wife.  Peron was deposed in 1955 and exiled during 18 years until 1973, 
and his party, the Justicialista Party, was forbidden to participate in the electoral 
process (Mora and Araujo, 1995). 
After a tumultuous period in which democratic governments alternated, Peron was 
re-elected and he took power in October 1973. He died in July of following year. 
His second wife while vice president, Maria Estela “Isabel” Martinez de Peron, 
succeeded him.  Peron’s second government again used price controls and increa-
sed government spending as their tools of social policy, as had happened almost 
twenty years before. As a result of unbalanced economy. 
In 1976 the Chief of the Army Commander, Jorge Rafael Videla led a new coup 
d´état. The military government remained in power until 1983 and opted for a 
policy opposed to Peron´s policy. They developed a more liberal economic policy, 
opting for the opening of the economy to foreign trade, price liberalization and 
fiscal austerity in social spending. After the populist government of Juan and Isabel 
Peron, inflation edged 350% annually. The military government did nothing about 
it and contributed to the process with excessive spending during the Malvinas War 
(Marchesi, 2004). 
In 1983, inflation edged the 430% and assumed power after free elections, Raul 
Alfonsin, he belonged to Radical Civic Union (UCR), the Peronist opposition party. 
The main problem for the government was to fight inflation and ran the Austral 
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Plan, which required an austere fiscal and monetary performance, plus a tax reform 
to improve the financing of expenditure. The plan ordered the freezing of prices 
and utility rates and the regulation of interest rates and the exchange rates. After a 
year of implementation, the monetary policy and price controls were relaxed. The 
latter attempt to control inflation was the Spring Plan, which was also unsuccessful: 
inflation marked a record 4923% in 1989 (Mora and Araujo, 1995). 
In this situation of economic chaos, Carlos Saul Menem, took over the government 
in 1989. He was the Peronist and former governor of La Rioja. His Peronist tradi-
tion was not in favor of a heterodox shock policies needed to combat inflation and 
he spent a year without a fixed course. In 1990 inflation reached 1343% and the 
economy had remain stagnant from two decades ago, as the average annual growth 
during that period was less than 1% (Mora and Araujo, 1995). 
These facts forced the Argentine government to take drastic measures: after nearly 
twenty years of inflation, it was thought that the only way to give confidence to staff 
was through the “Austral Convertibility”, in relation to 1-1 of Argentina currency 
against the U.S. dollar. The only inflation in the economy would be imported from 
the United States. 
The plan achieved the goal of ending inflation. In 1992, it was only 17% in 1993 
was 7.4%, after 3.9% in 1994, and every year after that was below 2% 2002 until. 
(Edwards, 2009). However, a system of fixed exchange rate brought some economic 
challenges for Argentina. To maintain equivalence, its competitiveness should have 
evolved like the U.S., but this did not happen: the dollar rose against other leading 
currencies in the world and the peso came up, making the costs of production in 
Argentina would higher than in other countries, so that the country lost competi-
tiveness (Edwards, 2009).   
Additionally, since amount of resources issued depended only on the flow of dollars, 
the country’s capital outflow caused interest rates to rise. This mechanism should 
again attract capital, but in the contexts of Tequila and the Russian crisis (Paramio), 
they turned away from emerging markets fearing a repetition of similar scenarios in 
other countries. These last two required immediate treatment, but the government 
sought reelection and did not allow it. Once again the populist strategies of the 
leaders are used to keep them in power.
Added to this was the lack of flexibility in domestic prices. The syndicalist tradition 
and a very regulated labor market hampered the flexibility of wages to adjust the 
delay in competitiveness (real wages increased by 42% between 1990 and 1998).
But the biggest problem for the economy was Argentina’s external debt, correlated 
with the maintenance of a high fiscal deficit throughout the nineties and the early 
years of the new millennium. In 2001 the debt approached 150 billion U.S. $. This 
figure corresponded to nearly 50% of its GDP (Edwards, 2009).
In 1999 the problem of convertibility needed to be resolved. The Washington 
Consensus reforms suggested maintaining a competitive exchange rate and trade 
liberalization. Argentina was in an impasse. If devalued, would bankrupt many com-
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panies and would probably have to declare a moratorium on its debt. If Argentina 
did not devaluate, Its debt would become more expensive.  President Menem chose 
not to devalue, perhaps with the illusory hope of getting re-elected a second time.
In late 1999, the government of Fernando de la Rua (UCR-Alliance Frepaso) started. 
This government opted to keep the convertible model, adjusting the fiscal situation 
and avoid new borrowing. It tried to give the necessary credibility to the government 
to encourage foreign capital coming to Argentina would return to the path of growth. 
After months of marches and counter marches, street protests, strikes, several let-
ters of intent signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and finally the 
straw that broke the camel´s back was the announcement of the withdrawal limit 
for bank deposits to $ 250 per week (corralito).  Fernando de la Rua was forced to 
resign (Edwards, 2010).  After three interim presidents that lasted just a few days 
in to government comes, allowing it to Eduardo Duhalde, who finally devalues the 
peso float freely against the dollar, plunging the country into a serious crisis, but 
necessary measure to stabilize at levels close to 3 pesos dollar in late 2003.  
In 1999 De la Rua inherited a country with a delicate economic situation, a combi-
nation of high and rising public debt, a persistent fiscal deficit, high unemployment 
and rigidity in the exchange rate and monetary policy (Gervassonni, 2010).
Between 1999 and 2001, the crisis in Argentina was unsustainable. This triggered 
the largest financial collapse in recent history in Argentina, which led, inter alia, 
to the peso devaluation and a deflation (Gervasonni, 2010). To counter the crisis, 
President Fernando de la Rua, asked the International Monetary Fund resources and 
increased its domestic debt.  The result of this policy was fatal for Argentinean debt, 
ie bankruptcy caused the state at the end of 2001, to declare the public debt default. 
The political and economic crisis of Argentina during the period 1999-2001, did not 
give the possibility to President Fernando de la Rua to implement economic policies 
that would allow him to improve his image, making it clear that macroeconomic 
populism was not present in this government. 
De la Rua resigned on 20 December. There were three interim presidents Ramón 
Puerta, Adolfo Rodriguez Saa and Eduardo Camano between 20 December to 1 
January. A moratorium on payment of external debt was declared on December 23, 
in an environment that was viewed internally and externally as a strong motivating 
populism.
On January 1, Congress elected Eduardo Duhalde, to complete the term of de la 
Rua.  The first days of January 2002, the system finished collapsing with the Emer-
gency Law and leaving the Convertibility law, establishing new restrictions on the 
removal of deposits and the pesification of dollar bank deposits. (Gutierrez, 2003)
From 2003 to 2007, Argentina experienced a phase of economic growth with rates 
ranging around 9% in part due to a high dollar economic policy designed to en-
courage import substitution, which increased the competitiveness of industry in 
Argentina, This ended the crisis.  Some economists argue that argentine inflation 
presented during the government of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Kirchner, is due 
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to several factors, including growth in public spending, lower investment, expan-
sion of the monetary base by issuing pesos to finance public expenditure increases, 
among others (Jueguen, 2010).
In the government of Cristina Kirchner the global crisis affected the local economy. 
The costs could be contained by timely monetary expansion policy and public 
spending. Less income and more spending, a strategy to avoid higher social costs, 
resulted in a loss of fiscal surplus. That surplus, which reached nearly 3.0 points 
of GDP in 2008, fell to a deficit of 0.4 in 2009, according to private estimates (Ed-
wards, 2009). 
Again, during the governments of Nestor Kirchner and Cristina de Kirchner ma-
croeconomic populism was evident, as it used to appear. Expansive growth poli-
cies endangered economic stability, to the point of hiding their effects through the 
manipulation of inflation. 
4.1.2 Chile  
Historically, Chile has been characterized as one of the countries of greater political 
stability and democratic development in Latin America.  During the twentieth cen-
tury, in contrast with Peru and Argentina, Chile only suffered two military coups. 
The first was in 1932, but did not establish a military government, but elections 
were held. The winner was Victor Arturo Alessandri Palma.  The second coup 
d´état was by Augusto Pinochet in 1973, deposing the then constitutional president 
Salvador Allende (Marchesi, 2004). 
After First World War, Chile was in a good economic situation. Developing a liberal 
model exporting mainly primary products generating the effect of linkage with other 
sectors of the economy. The Great Depression hit hard in Chile. The export sector 
collapsed with a crash and the Chilean economy was one of the hardest hit in the 
world. After this experience, Chile’s development policy was oriented towards 
industrialization, the ISI and increased state intervention. By the forties, both the 
State and the private sector played a business role.
However, in the fifties began economists began to notice some of the shortcomings 
in the import substitution model (ISI). Non-industrial sectors such as agriculture 
stagnated. It discourages the development of new export products. The populist 
guidance of some governments during this period fostered macroeconomic imba-
lances and started for the first time an inflationary process in 1955 (Marchesi, 2004).
In 1964 the government of Eduardo Frei Montalvo of the Christian Democrats began. 
This government sought to stabilize inflation, industrial modernization with the 
state as a source of investment and establish social structural reforms such as land 
reform, nationalization of the copper and the development of grassroots organiza-
tions to promote citizen participation. 
However, the antagonism of the political parties prevented the formation of a strong 
government and after six years of government failed to meet the expectations, of 
political and economic transformation generated in the population. 
58 Criterio Libre JurídiCo - VoL. 7 No. 1 - eNero - JuNio de 2010
otáLora, r
Therefore, in 1970, the Chilean people opted for the socialist candidate of Popular 
Unity (UP), Salvador Allende. This government was proclaimed anti-imperialist, 
anti-oligarchic and antitrust Its main objective was to strengthen the structural 
changes in the distribution of property. To achieve this should nationalize the 
means of production and encourage greater participation (Edwards, 2009, 124). 
Its main reforms were the nationalization of the country’s mineral resources, the 
nationalization of large industrial enterprises, nationalization of banks and the 
deepening of land reform.   
From the macroeconomic point of view, this government applied an expansionary 
fiscal policy by raising the salaries of state employees, increasing the state apparatus 
and over-spending, and price controls. This policy can be categorized as populist 
and as such had no regard for macroeconomic balances.
This experiment ended as the other populist experiences in Latin America: fiscal 
deficit financed by Central Bank issues, hyperinflation and falling real wages, hur-
ting the very people it tries to help. By 1972, inflation was already out of control, 
reaching 206.5%, while for 1973 reached 605.1%. Successive strikes destabilized 
the government and the general chaos culminated in the coup led by General Au-
gusto Pinochet (Edwards, 2009, 125)
The first two years of the Pinochet government turned to control the macroecono-
mic imbalances left by Allende. In parallel, established a market economic policy, 
a fairly pure neoliberal model, with a sui generis property in Latin America: total 
autonomy to implement the policies it wishes. It eliminated price controls, tariffs 
were lowered dramatically to encourage imports, financial markets were liberali-
zed and international capital flows were restructured and reduced public sector 
spending, Land reform was reversed and they began an aggressive privatization 
process of public enterprises.
Chile suffered terribly both economically and socially after the debt crisis of 1982. 
However. In 1984 Chile began a phase of high economic growth which would lar-
gely reverse the ravages of the crisis of the early decade. In 1989, after losing the 
referendum to stay in power, Pinochet calls for free elections in March 1990 the 
“Government of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy” begins chaired by Patri-
cio Aylwin of the Christian Democrats, who took the decision not to change the 
historical direction of economic policy and gave priority to reducing poverty and 
improving income distribution through active social policies. (Edwards, 2009, 124). 
This strategy was consolidating long-term development and supported by the growth 
and diversification of exports, while reaffirming the importance of maintaining 
macroeconomic balance through fiscal austerity.
This approach was vital for generating a climate of institutional stability needed 
to generate private investment. This policy was followed by the governments of 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tegla (1994-1999) and Ricardo Lagos (2000 - 2006). During the 
nineties, Chile grew at an average rate of 7% annually. This prosperity was reflec-
ted in the improvement in real wages, increased employment levels and falling 
poverty and destitution.
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The government of Michelle Bachelet was characterized by the high value of copper 
resources. Chile decided to save these resources and was able to successfully address 
the systemic crisis that hit credit markets in developed countries.  (Cepal, 2009). 
For this reason, Chile was less affected, in conjunction with other Latin American 
countries.  Generating a fiscal surplus in 2008, allowed the State succeeds in accu-
mulating financial resources which prevented the internal or external borrowing 
(Garretón, 2010).
The economic measures taken in the handling of the crisis for the government of 
Michelle Bachelet, consisted of adjustments to monetary and financial, fiscal and 
exchange rate policies and foreign trade (Garretón, 2010).
In relation to monetary and financial policies there were more facilities for the area 
of foreign investment and the business sector, among other measures.  Fiscal policy 
promoted measures investment and consumption.  Exchange rate policy, foreign 
trade and foreign currency liquidity provided and improve coverage program of 
bank loans to exporters (Cepal, 2009). 
In 2009, Chile’s risk rating by a rating agency changed from A2 to A1, placing it in 
the most favorable in the region (Garreton, 2010).
As a result of good macroeconomic performance, assessment and policy, in January 
2010, Chile became a member state of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). 
The economic policies implemented in the Bachelet government have been com-
mensurate to the situation and have sought to generate sustainable economic 
stability, so there is no evidence of macroeconomic populism in this government.
4.1.3 Peru 
Peru has been characterized by political instability. During the twentieth century 
occurred 8 coup d´etat and ran 15 different military presidencies.  The transition of 
democratic government in Peru is more the exception than the rule. The prevailing 
model of economic development until 1962 was a liberal and export model with 
mainly agricultural products (rice, sugar and cotton) and agribusiness (Marchesi, 
2004). 
However, the export sector is not articulated with the national industry to produce 
value-added products, making the economy vulnerable to price changes. The high 
profitability in the export of primary products was adisincentive to investment 
in the industrial sector, while maintaining low tariffs and competitive prices for 
imported goods. Under this system, the input of capital and profit repatriation 
were virtually unrestricted and state involvement and participation were minimal.
Between 1950 and 1962 the annual average fiscal deficit was -0.2% of GDP, inflation 
was 7.0% per year, GDP grew annually at a rate of 5.3% and foreign debt amounted 
to U.S. $ 158 million. However, the social situation was bad and was characterized 
by high concentration of income.
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In 1962, more than 30 years after the start of the ISI in Argentina and Chile, the 
elected President Fernando Belaúnde’s Popular Action party, began to implement 
this model. In this period were applied policies such as tariff increase for finished 
goods, fixed exchange rate, price controls, increased government investment in in-
frastructure, increased public spending, increasing foreign debt (which is necessary 
because of a lack of foreign exchange  generated by the exchange rate appreciation) 
and the process began with land reform. However, these reforms did not have poli-
tical consensus, especially from export sector which was directly affected.
The reforms were not considered radical. In October 1968, General Juan Velasco led 
a coup d´état. His model was an extreme version of the ISI and state intervention. 
He nationalized most international companies, maintained high tariffs on finish 
goods continued to increase fiscal expenditures through investment in infrastruc-
ture (Edwards, 2009).
As a result, the fiscal deficit continued to increase, which was covered by foreign 
debt, also intensified the process of agricultural reform, as farm ownership was 
highly concentrated. It is important to point out how. It was wrong for Peru land 
reform to be combined with the ISI, when much to these two incompatible policies 
dismantled the national productive apparatus. Agriculture went from 23% of GDP 
in 1950 to only 15% in 1968. Paradoxically, Peru began to import food (Marchessi, 
2004). 
Velasco was in a precarious state of health, while the nationalist model went into 
crisis. Popular discontent, manifested through several strikes and riots, were evi-
dent. Thus, in August 1975, General Francisco Morales Bermudez was proclaimed 
President of the Republic.
During the period 1975-1980 he attempted to reverse some of the measures of Velas-
co, but not the reform or nationalization private enterprises. On the one hand, the 
government encouraged non-traditional exports through successive devaluations 
of the currency (that generated inflation).  The government tried, without success, 
repeated adjustments of the fiscal and external debt, but they continued to increase. 
This period benefited from a rise in export prices of metals.
In 1980, democracy returned to Peru and Fernando Belaúnde, leader of Popular 
Action, was elected. He organized a co-government with the Popular Party’s center-
right Christian. The government applied a weird combination of liberal politics 
to commerce populist in the macroeconomic. He continued external borrowing, 
which conditioned the rhetoric of economic policy. 
To get the credits of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), 
the government spoke of reducing inflation and opening the economy, but in practice 
implemented an expansionary fiscal policy, increasing public investment beyond 
its means. This measure, coupled with small devaluations of the exchange rate, 
meant that inflation remained above 70% during those years, reaching 158% in 
1985 (American Bureau, 1985).
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Income inequality, inherent since the inception of the republic, had not been re-
solved. Thus, in the early eighties, subversive movements Sendero Luminoso and 
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) were born and the government 
failed to articulate a coherent strategy to overcome in its infancy.
In 1985, Alan Garcia was elected. He represented APRA, the oldest party in Peru. 
APRA was a socialist, anti-imperialist and revolutionary. This party decides to 
unilaterally declare a moratorium on foreign debt, a move that immediately isolated 
Peru from the international financial community.
Garcia returned to the ISI and state intervention through expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies. Again applied price controls, increased tariffs on imports, pro-
hibited a large number of commodities that could be manufactured in Peru. Alan 
Garcia tried to control inflation by fixing the basic price of the economy (such as 
gasoline and light), as the state owned production companies). 
During the implementation of populist model of Alan Garcia, the economy grew by 
12.1% in 1986 (due to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies). The next year 
the economy heated up leading to the attempted nationalization of banking, in 
which entrepreneurs and investors lost confidence in the country (Marchessi, 2004).
By 1988, the fiscal deficit had reached 9.7% of GDP, while the product shrank by 
9.4%. Alan Garcia never considered the possibility of pursuing a policy shock like 
orthodox prices. If the government had taken corrective measures in 1987, when 
inflation was only 1145%, it could have avoided three years of additional suffering 
for the people of Peru.  By 1988, inflation had climbed to 1722% and for 1989 was 
2775% (Edwards, 2009).
Phenomenon of terrorism continued to rise, transforming a rural phenomenon to 
become urban. The long queues for food, strikes, and terrorist violence led to the 
Peruvian people to seek an alternative to the traditional parties.
At first, that alternative Mario Vargas Llosa represented the Libertad Movement, 
which is allied with the Popular Cristian Party Acción Popular, two traditional 
parties which join to form the Frente Democrático (FREDEMO). Vargas Llosa 
government pursued a policy of “redistribution freezing” by decree the prices of 
essential nutrients. When prices were devalued traders kept the food and black 
markets emerged.
In 1990, the country welcomes Alberto Fujimori as a new President of the Republic. 
He decided to pursue a policy of shock, as the only sensible measure. First, the 
prices rose dramatically to their estimated real level and were then released from 
government control. 
At the same time, Fujimory applied a tight monetary policy, issuing only the es-
sentials. The policy worked, as inflation went from a disastrous 7649% in 1990 
to 139% in 1991. In 1994, inflation was only 15%, and since 1997, Peru has had 
single digit inflation. (Edwards, 2009).
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During the period 1990-1995, the government initiated a series of reforms to trans-
form the Peruvian economy into a market economy. It began an intensive process 
of privatization, which favored an accumulated economic growth of 43% in the 
first seven years, the government  liberalized trade and foreign capital investment 
and more flexible industrial relations.
After the coup d’état of 1992, Abimael Guzman, Shining Path leader was captured, 
and in 1993 Peru promulgated a new Constitution which allowed presidential 
reelection. Fujimori was re-elected, was to become a progressively authoritarian 
and corrupt leader.  His third term lasted only three months because he had to flee 
to Japan, after the scandal of the first video of Montesinos’s corruption network.
There followed a transitional government led by Valentin Paniagua, interim Presi-
dent elected by the Congress, who called elections, but the winner was Alejandro 
Toledo. Toledo assumes power in July 2001 and he continued the focus of economy 
policy on the free market. 
The macroeconomic policy regime changed during the years 2000-2006.  Adopting 
a monetary policy framework based on inflation targeting reduced the cost of money 
and improve the international competitiveness of Peruvian products (Jiménez, 2007).
The main problem faced by the Government of Toledo was an excessively low 
inflation.  In late 2001, core inflation was below 1.5%, while in the first quarter of 
2002, inflation reached a record negative rate (Cuba, 2010).
In the last of the Fujimori administration, the fiscal deficit was above the 3% of GDP. 
The economic administration of President Toledo strengthened the control over 
public finances, thus reducing the fiscal deficit to 2.5% of GDP in 2001, for which 
it including launched a package of tax policies and administration, increasing the 
rate of general sales tax.  In the same period the public debt as a percentage of GDP 
fell from 46.1% to 38.0%. (CIES, 2010).
The government of Alan Garcia implemented expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies that explain the strong growth of domestic demand in 2007.  Increased 
demand led to an economic expansion and an increase in imports.  This generated 
a trade deficit and an increase in inflation, to increasing the financial vulnerability 
of the economy and loss of credibility for the Central Bank.  Garcia used policies 
that show an apparent expansionary economic growth which was not sustainable, 
and ended up weakening and loosening the Peruvian economy. (CIES, 2010).
4.1.4 Venezuela 
In 1998, six years after realizing an unsuccessful rebellious attempt against Carlos 
Andres Perez, the colonel Hugo Chavez Frias was elected as President of Vene-
zuela. Since then his presidency has been defined as populist due to the different 
measures that including the following: very strong critic of the government of 
United States, of globalization and the market economy. During these years, the 
president has nationalized foreign companies, he has named his supporters in the 
Supreme Court, and he has implemented several programs directed to attending 
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to the health of population while attacking the illiteracy of the poorest population 
of the country (Edwards, 2009).  
Equally, he has changed the constitution to allow his perpetual reelection. Chavez 
defines himself as the standard-bearer of the “Bolivariana Revolution”. (Rodriguez, 
2008). Nevertheless, before Chavez, Venezuela had experienced already the cha-
racteristics of populism. The populist history of Venezuela, began in the middle 
of the eighties, in Jaime Lusinchi’s Presidency, when the fiscal deficit, the foreign 
debt, and the inflation increased in a substantial way.
Between 1989 and 1993, the president Carlos Andres Perez tried to restore the 
economic order, to reduce the inflation, and to adopt modern measures but they 
were weak. When Perez assumed power, the foreign debt was enormous and out of 
control, there was a shortage of food and credit had disappeared (Haussman, 1995, 
p. 261). One of the measures of stronger shock implemented by Perez was a strong 
devaluation, which reduced the value of the bolivar by two thirds (Haussman, 
1995). In three months, the price of the public transport increased thirty per cent. 
As consequence of the multiple disturbances caused by the dissatisfaction of the 
population, this sad episode of the Venezuelan history was known as the caracazo 
(Lopez, 2003) and resulted in the deaths of more than 300 people in less than 5 
days (Lopez, 2003).
One of the major consequences of the Caracazo, is the failed coup by Hugo Chavez in 
February 1992 against the government of Carlos Andres Perez, Though unsuccessful, 
Chavez was popular among the population, which then lead to the power.  The 
Venezuelan people were convinced that corruption was the most serious problem 
facing the country and Chavez was seen at the time as a hero.
In 1993, Perez was accused of corruption and removed from his post by the Con-
gress. In 1994, Rafael Caldera, who had been President between 1969 and 1974 
came to power thanks to a populist platform that was opposed to the reforms and 
to the globalization. 
His administration undid most of the shy reforms implemented during the second 
period of Carlos Andrés Perez, realized in the frame of the consensus of Washington. 
In the first two years of Caldera´s presidency,  his administration was characterized 
by rapid inflation, control of prices, fall of the bolivar, bank crises and economic 
stagnation. 
In 1994 the government liberated Colonel Hugo Chavez from prison and signed 
an agreement with the International Monetary Found (IMF). In exchange for 1600 
million dollars the government promised to reduce inflation and to reactivate 
growth, by a program of the modernization of the state and liberalization of the 
economy (Naím, 2006).
When Chavez assumed the power in 1998, Venezuela was the country of Latin 
America, which had implemented the least neoliberal reforms. For this reason is 
possible to affirm that Chavez is not a product of the Consensus of Washington. 
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Chávez is a product of the corruption, the economic stagnation and the complacency 
of the Venezuelan elite (Edwards, 2009, 261).
During the first months of his presidency, Hugo Chavez had taken important deci-
sions to change the political and economic system in Venezuela. In July 1999 he had 
established a Constituent Assembly. This Assembly approved a new constitution 
in December 1999. The new constitution made important changes: It changed the 
official name of the country to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, replaced the 
bicameral Congress by a single chamber, which increased the power of the executive. 
Chavez also introduced changes in the system of electing judges and promised free 
education and health and quality for Venezuelans. (Corrales, 2006).
Chavez’s economic policy had three objectives from the beginning: accelerate the 
rate of economic growth, provide social services and nationalize strategic companies 
(Edwards, 2009, p. 262.) Chavez removed the centralized Ministry of family and 
social assistance in the Single Social Fund (FUS), administered by the military. 
Also Chavez´s government created various social programs called “missions” aimed 
at providing medical services to the poorest Venezuelans.  The government also 
implemented literacy campaigns and changes to improve the coverage and quality 
of education (Corrales, 2006).
The use of these social programs for political purposes, “that since the political 
theory called the patronage” (Walker, 2008), have been considered a favorite tools 
of populist politicians (Edwards, 2009).           
From 2002, public spending rose sharply and the central bank issued currency 
more easily. Accordingly, the official inflation rate was over 30%, there was a price 
control and commodities became scarce. (Edwards, 2009).
Despite these social policies, growth in Venezuela has not been particularly signi-
ficant in relation to the rest of Latin American countries (3.5% on average between 
1999 and 2007). In fact, some analysts attribute the entire Venezuelan economic 
growth in this period to the increase in oil prices and the control exerted on the 
government oil sector by the government (Rodriguez, 2008) but not to the success 
of the social policies of the Chavez government. 
4.2 Colombia: why was not macroeconomic populism in our 
country?
As we have seen the countries of Latin America went through this phase of populism, 
with disastrous effects for the economy and welfare of its inhabitants. We note how 
the countries have some economic and political memory, enabling them to learn 
from their mistakes. We should ask ourselves if the populist political knowledge 
is absolutely untenable, or whether it can succeed. Colombia has hadn´t absence a 
populist policy in the last four decades.
Colombia has been perhaps the exception to the rule of Latin American hyperinfla-
tion. In the last decades and until early 1990, Colombia has been characterized by 
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macroeconomic stability, in contrast to the enormous volatility that other countries 
had in Latin America. 
This stability without doubt is given by economic and political factors. On the 
one hand, economic stability generated by the coffee chains, led to unfavorable 
conditions for the emergence of populist movements. 
Furthermore, the existence of a consolidated system of two political parties, con-
tributed to an ideological convergence that has enabled the design and discussion 
of economic policies in a non-ideologically polarized, This situation has hampered 
the introduction of macroeconomic populism. This led in the twentieth century 
the Colombian economy was one of the few in Latin America that never had hy-
perinflation.
The Evolution of the Central Bank in Colombia has also been identified as one of 
the key elements of macroeconomic stability (Banco de la Republica, 1998)
In 1923 Colombian created the Bank of the Republic, because the country needed an 
institution to put order to the issuance process, following the crisis of 1922.  With 
the help of the Kemmerer mission was established by Act 25 of 1923, the Organic 
Statute of the Bank of the Republic, which gave exclusive authority to issue legal 
tender, managing foreign reserves and acting as lender to the government, but only 
when necessary.  In 1951 Kemmerer mission designed the monetary, credit and 
exchange policies. (Banco de la República, 1998, 164). 
1963 marked another important point in the evolution of the Colombian Central 
Bank, because government created the Monetary Board, which became independent 
come the conduct of monetary policy, credit and exchange policies of private actors 
(which previously were part of the Board Directors of the Bank of the Republic). It 
also consolidated the Banking Superintendency how the financial system watchdog. 
(Banco de la República, 1998, 171). 
In 1973, the Bank of the Republic became a financial public entity and in 1982 
became an economic public entity, unique in nature, with special administrative 
arrangements, legal and independent assets. With the Issue of the Constitution of 
1991, the Bank of the Republic rose to constitutional status and also to over the 
management of monetary policy and the inflation control. (Gomez Arrubla, 1983). 
This independence of the Central Bank has encouraged the control of inflation, 
even at the expense of jobs and demand, and according to some of democracy itself.
Regarding the latter argument, it should be noted that the independence of central 
banks, driving away the temptation of populist as a tool as powerful as monetary 
policy, as submitted to the control of the Congress, academia, local financial markets 
and international public opinion.
In Colombia, during the government of Alvaro Uribe Velez, the Democratic Se-
curity policy proposed by his government (Source, 2010), resulted in feelings of 
security and confidence for the majority of Colombians, increasing the president’s 
popularity ratings.  
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However, in his management of economic policy, it is possible to observe some 
features of populism.  With the aim of increasing the fighting forces, the Democratic 
Security Tax was established in 2001, which raised 2.5 billion pesos in order to 
close the budget gap for 2002 law enforcement and fund the so-called “Emergency 
Plan” in 2003 (Vargas y García, 2008), which consisted in increasing the forces 
manpower both rural and urban. 
Some of the fiscal policy measures implemented during the government of Presi-
dent Uribe were: in 2002 he established the transitional tax assets through the law 
of internal disturbance. The government proposed a process of adjustment and 
austerity by announcing cut public spending by 1.5 billion pesos, as a result of the 
fiscal deficit of 3.3 percent of GDP in 2008.
Similarly, and in order to obtain more resources major state enterprises were pri-
vatized. (Vargas y García, 2008). Despite the announced austerity, the government 
increased its social spending programs such as investing in families in action, the 
expansion of subsidized health system, the new target population of the ICBF, 
breakfasts for children, protection for the elderly, increased training of the Seine, 
reducing unemployment, promoting micro-credit, the impetus to housing for the 
poor and increasing social investment (Website Presidency of the Republic, 2005), 
indicating that despite the high fiscal deficit, government spending continued to 
increase in military manpower and welfare policies without much impact on the 
welfare of society. 
Unemployment had a small reduction from 2002 to 2007.  However it increased 
from 2008 (see Graph 6). This increase may be associated with the effect of the 
global crisis on our country, taking into account the high degree of dependence of 
the Colombian economy on the U.S. economy.   
Monetary policy during the government of President Uribe led by the Bank of the 
Republic, was focused on continuing the system of inflation targeting. To this end, 
the Bank of the Republic used measures such as increasing the base rate and increa-
ses in bank reserves, amongst others. The reduction of inflation has significantly 
increased confidence the Colombian economy. (See Graph 7). 
It is possible to conclude that some features of the phenomenon called macroeco-
nomic populism were present during the administration of President Uribe.  He 
made use of economic policy to develop programs that allowed him to have a 
good national image, especially with the most vulnerable population, thus hiding 
the poor economic performance and serious problems of corruption within their 
government.
However, Colombia did not experience, like other Latin American countries at the 
time, the terrible consequences of macroeconomic populism. The strength of the 
institutions to which the Constitution had assigned the management of economic 
and fiscal policy and the control to prevent to use these tools in an irresponsible 
manner by the executive, coupled with the traditional central bank independence, 
explains this situation. 
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In conclusion, all these factors led to the Colombian economy being free of populist 
management.  It never had hyperinflation, and the country experienced the greatest 
macroeconomic stability in Latin America in the last sixty years. 
5. Conclusions
Four of the five economies studied: Argentina, Chile, Peru and Venezuela have 
suffered the delay of the import substitution model and the inflationary problems 
of populist policies. The exception is that Belaúnde and Velasco did twenty years 
after knowing that it had not worked in Peron’s Argentina.
Velasquismo inspired socialist Allende and allendisminspired Garcia, 12 years 
after learning that this model had failed in Chile. It is hard to understand the logic 
of repeating failed experiences in dogmatic convictions.
We should, in light of what has been studied in the five cases presented, reflect 
on some lessons that I think are important: The first lesson is the importance 
of having a good economy policy to allow a strong social policy. Improving 
the quality of life of people, it is almost impossible in a context of recession or 
negative growth.
The time needed to generate revenue and quality jobs in an economy is more than 
the speed with which these jobs are lost in times of crisis. That is, the impact of 
the crisis is always greater than the impact of the expansions. Therefore, generating 
a long-term sustained growth is a necessary but not insufficient to improve the 
quality of life of the population.
The second lesson is that one should not avoid a necessary and inevitable adjustment 
for political reasons, because if the adjustment is postponed, the treatment will end 
up being worse than the disease. Postponing the devaluation caused three years 
of additional suffering to the people of Argentina, and likewise for the Peruvians, 
who watched as little by little the quality of life was deteriorating.
Colombia is the exception to the rule of macroeconomic populism in Latin America. 
Different factors set out below (coffee stability bipartisan consensus macroeconomic 
policies, central bank independence, etc.) have never contributed to hyperinflation, 
and to maintained macroeconomic stability.
However, the absence of populism does not imply that there were always chosen 
to sound policies, at least on social issues on the poverty levels. In conclusion, 
macroeconomic populism was extremely harmful to the welfare of the countries 
studied and Colombia was the exception to the rule.
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Chart 3. Presidents and presidential terms since 1950
ARGENTINA ARGENTINA CHILE COLOMBIA PERÚ VENEZUELA
1946 - 1951
Peron, Juan 
Domingo
1976 - 1981
Videla, Jorge 
Rafael
1946 - 1952 
Gabriel 
González 
Videla
1950-1951
Laureano 
Gómez 
Castro
1948-1950 
General 
Manuel 
A. Odria 
Amoretti
1950-1952.
Germán 
Suárez 
Flamerich
1951 - 1955
Perón, Juan 
Domingo
1981 - 1981
Viola, Roberto 
Eduardo
1952 - 1958 
Carlos 
Ibáñez del 
Campo
1951-1953 
Roberto 
Urdaneta 
Arbeláez
1950 
General 
Zenón 
Noriega
1952-1958
Marcos Pérez 
Jiménez
1955 - 1955
Lonardi, 
Eduardo
1981 - 1982
Galtieri, 
Leopoldo 
Fortunato
1958 - 
1964 Jorge 
Alessandri 
Rodríguez
1953-1957
Teniente 
General 
Gustavo 
Rojas 
Pinilla
1950-1956 
General 
Manuel 
A. Odría 
Amoretti
1958-1959
Wolfgang 
Larrazábal
1955 - 1958
Aramburu, 
Pedro Eugenio
1982 - 1983
Bignone, 
Reynaldo 
Benito
1964 - 1970 
Eduardo 
Frei 
Montalva
1957-1958
 Junta 
Militar de 
Gobierno
1956-1962
 Manuel 
Prado 
Ugarteche
1959-1959
Edgar 
Sanabria
1958 - 1962
Frondizi, 
Arturo
1983 - 1989
Alfonsín, Raúl 
Ricardo
1970 - 1973 
Salvador 
Allende 
Gossens
1962-1966 
Guillermo 
León 
Valencia
1962-1963 
General 
Ricardo 
Pérez 
Godoy y 
General 
Nicolás 
Lindley
1959-1964
Rómulo 
Betancourt
1962 - 1963
Guido, José 
María
1989 - 1995
Menem, Carlos 
Saúl
1973 - 1990 
Augusto 
Pinochet 
Ugarte
1966-1970
 Carlos 
Lleras 
Restrepo
1964-1968 
Fernando 
Belaúnde 
Terry
1964-1969
Raúl Leoni
1963 - 1966
Illia, Arturo 
Humberto
1995 - 1999
Menem, Carlos 
Saúl
1990 - 1994 
Patricio 
Aylwin 
Azócar
1970-1974 
Misael 
Pastrana 
Borrero
1968-1975 
General 
Juan 
Velasco 
Alvarado
1969-1974
Rafael Caldera
1966 - 1970
Onganía, Juan 
Carlos
1999 - 2001
De la Rúa, 
Fernando
1994 - 2000 
Eduardo 
Frei Ruiz-
Montalva
1974-1978 
Alfonso 
López 
Michelsen
1975-1980 
General 
Francisco 
Morales 
Bermúdez 
Cerruti
1974-1979
Carlos Andrés 
Pérez
1970 - 1971
Levingston, 
Roberto 
Marcelo
2001 - 2001
Puerta, Ramón
2000 - 2006 
Ricardo 
Lagos
1978-1982
 Julio César 
Turbay 
Ayala
1980-1985 
Fernando 
Belaúnde 
Terry
1979-1984
 Luis Herrera 
Campins
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ARGENTINA ARGENTINA CHILE COLOMBIA PERÚ VENEZUELA
1971 - 1973
Lanusse, 
Alejandro 
Agustín
2001 - 2001
Rodríguez Saá, 
Adolfo
2006 - 
present 
Michelle 
Bachelet 
Jeria
1982-1986
Belisario 
Betancur 
Cuartas
1985-1990
 Alan 
García 
Pérez
1984-1989
Jaime Lusinchi 
1973 - 1973
Cámpora, 
Héctor José
2001 - 2002
Camaño, 
Eduardo
1986-1990
Virgilio 
Barco 
Vargas
1990-1995 
Alberto 
Kenya 
Fujimori 
Fujimori
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Graph 1. Total foreign debt  
Source: CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. Development Own with 
database available at: http://websie.eclac.cl/infest/ajax/cepalstat.asp?carpeta=estadisticas
Graph 2. Social Policies - Public Spending
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Graph 3. Inflation 
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Graph 4. Gross Domestic Product 
Gross Domestic Product in dollars at constant  price 2000
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Graph 5. Variation Gross Domestic Product 
Gross Domestic Product in dollars at constant  price 2000
(annual variation rate)
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 Graph 6. Unemployment Rate Of Colombia 
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Graph 7. Annual Inflation In Colombia 
Annual inflation in Colombia (2002-2009)
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